Abstracts

Books: authored

The Metaphysics of Good and Evil (London, New York: Routledge, 2020)

The Metaphysics of Good and Evil is the first full-length contemporary defence, from the perspective of analytic philosophy, of the Scholastic theory of good and evil – the theory of Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, and most medieval and Thomistic philosophers. Goodness is analysed as obedience to nature. Evil is analysed as the privation of goodness. Goodness, surprisingly, is found in the non-living world, but in the living world it takes on a special character. The book analyses various kinds of goodness, showing how they fit into the Scholastic theory. The privation theory of evil is given its most comprehensive contemporary defence, including an account of truthmakers for truths of privation and an analysis of how causation by privation should be understood. In the end, all evil is deviance – a departure from the goodness prescribed by a thing’s essential nature.

Opting Out: Conscience and Cooperation in a Pluralistic Society (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 2018)

We live in a liberal, pluralistic, largely secular society where, in theory, there is fundamental protection for freedom of conscience generally and freedom of religion in particular. There is, however, both in statute and common law, increasing pressure on religious believers and conscientious objectors (outside wartime) to act in ways that violate their sincere, deeply held beliefs. This is particularly so in health care, where conscientious objection is coming under extreme pressure. I argue that freedom of religion and conscience need to be put on a sounder footing both legislatively and by the courts, particularly in health care. I examine a number of important legal cases in the UK and US, where freedom of religion and conscience have come into conflict with government mandates or equality and anti-discrimination law. In these and other cases we find one of two results: either the conscientious objector loses out against competing rights, or the conscientious objector succeeds, but due to what I consider unsound judicial reasoning. In particular, cases involving cooperation in what the objector considers morally impermissible according to their beliefs have been wrongly understood by some American courts. I argue that a reasonable theory of cooperation incorporated into judicial thinking would enable more acceptable results that gave sufficientprotection to conscientious objectors without risking a judicial backlash against objectors who wanted to take their freedoms too far.

I also venture into broader, more controversial waters concerning what I call freedom of dissociation – the fundamental right to withdraw from associating with people, groups, and activities. It is no more than the converse of freedom of association, which all free societies recognise as a basic right. How far should freedom of dissociation go? What might society be like if freedom of dissociation were given more protection in law than it currently has? It would certainly give freedom of religion and conscience a substantial foundation, but it could also lead to discriminatory behaviour to which many people would object. I explore some of these issues, before going back to the narrower area of freedom of conscience and religion in health care, making some proposals about how the law could strengthen these basic pillars of a liberal, free society.

Real Essentialism (London, New York: Routledge, 2007)

This book sets out a system of realist metaphysics in the Aristotelian tradition, applying it to fundamental metaphysical and scientific problems. First, the theory is contrasted with the contemporary essentialism of Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam, and their followers, which is shown to be inadequate to the task of justifying real, objective, knowable essences. Next, the book criticizes the anti-essentialism of Locke, Quine, Wittgenstein, and Popper. After a further defence of the reality and knowability of essence, the system of real essentialism is laid out, beginning with a defence of hylemorphism - prime matter and substantial form as the foundation of essence. There follows an account of substance, classification, individuation, and identity. Essence and existence, powers, and laws of nature are then analyzed, followed by properties, artefacts, and origins. The book concludes by applying real essentialism in great depth to three central problems at the interface of science and metaphysics: the nature of life, the reality of biological species, and the essence of the person.

Moral Theory: A Non-Consequentialist Approach (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000)

This book sets out the basic system used to solve moral problems, the system that consequentialists deride as 'traditional morality'. The central concepts, principles and distinctions of traditional morality are explained and defended: rights; justice; the good; virtue; the intention/foresight distinction; the acts/omissions distinction; and, centrally, the fundamental value of human life.

Applied Ethics: A Non-Consequentialist Approach (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000)

This book focuses the central concepts of traditional morality - rights, justice, the good, virtue, and the fundamental value of human life - on a number of pressing contemporary problems, including abortion, euthanasia, animals, capital punishment, and war.

The Metaphysics of Identity over Time (London/New York: Palgrave Macmillan/St Martin's Press, 1993)

This book is a systematic investigation into the metaphysical foundations of identity over time. I elaborate and evaluate the most common theory about the persistence of objects through time and change, namely the classical theory of spatio-temporal continuity. I show how the theory requires an ontology of temporal parts, according to which objects are made up of temorally extended segments or stages. This ontology is criticized as unwarranted by modern space-time physics, and as internally incoherent. I argue that identity over time should be seen as a primitive or unanalyzable phenomenon, and that the so-called puzzle cases and paradoxes of identity can be dealt with without recourse to such an ontology.

Books: edited

Classifying Reality (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013; 136pp.)

Contributors: E. J. Lowe; D. H. Mellor; Tuomas E. Tahko; Stephen Boulter; Gary S. Rosenkrantz; Barry Smith.

The Old New Logic: Essays on the Philosophy of Fred Sommers (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005; 242pp.)

Contributors: P. F. Strawson; Fred Sommers; George Englebretsen; E. J. Lowe; Frank C. Keil; Alan Berger; Patrick Suppes; William C. Purdy; Steven Lindell; Aris Noah; David S. Oderberg.

(ed. with T. Chappell) Human Values: New Essays on Ethics and Natural Law (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004; 272pp; rev. ed. p/back 2007)

Contributors: John Cottingham; Christopher Tollefsen; Christopher Martin; Henry S. Richardson; Timothy Chappell; David S. Oderberg; Suzanne Uniacke; Jacqueline A. Laing; Gerard J. Hughes; Helen Watt; Mark C. Murphy.

Form and Matter: Themes in Contemporary Metaphysics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999; 119 pp.)

Contributors: E. J. Lowe; Peter M. Simons; John Haldane; Kit Fine; Joshua Hoffman; Gary S. Rosenkrantz; Michael C. Rea.

(ed. with Jacqueline A. Laing) Human Lives: Critical Essays on Consequentialist Bioethics (London: Palgrave Macmillan/New York: St Martin's Press, 1997; 244 pp.)

Contributors: Cora Diamond; Nicholas Denyer; Stephen R. L. Clark; Brian Scarlett; Timothy Chappell; Grant Gillett; John Cottingham; Lance Simmons; J. L. A. Garcia; Janet E. Smith; Jacqueline A. Laing; David S. Oderberg.

Articles

'On the Nature of Mistakes in Nature', (C.J. Austin, D.S. Oderberg, J. Hill), Global Philosophy 35 (5) (2025).

Some things happen of necessity, others merely happen to occur – but are there things that happen to occur, but should not have? The latter constitute mistakes and, prima facie, they are everywhere – from our setting the wrong cutlery at the dinner table to young turtles crawling in the wrong direction to the safety of the sea. As obvious and ubiquitous as they may seem, the question of whether mistakes are real is not an unfounded one. For inherent in the nature of mistakes is the core concept of normativity, as mistakes imply the existence of states of affairs that are supposed to occur, but which unfortunately do not. Whether normativity is a feature of the ontological fabric of our world, rather than an epistemological by-product of the heuristic framework we use to comprehend its denizens and their activities, is a question at the centre of a long-standing debate in the philosophy of science. In this paper, we will ask: what must the world be like if mistakes are really out there? In answering that question, we will highlight some central aspects of the nature of mistakes that any ontological foundation which purports to include them must somehow accommodate. After showing that even the most promising ontological framework that might do so – namely, a powers ontology – is seemingly not up to the task, we will propose a novel refocusing of the analysis of the nature of mistakes, one centred on the metaphysics of causal feedback and the concept of organismal flourishing.

'Miracles and the Wooden Leg Problem', Religious Studies , July 2025.

The famous Catholic pilgrimage site at Lourdes, France, until fairly recently displayed hundreds of discarded crutches as testament to miraculous cures. It has, though, never displayed a wooden leg. Hence the Wooden Leg Problem (WLP) for believers in miracles: if God can cure paralysis, why does He seem never to have given an amputee back their lost limb? The WLP is a severe challenge for believers in miracles and must be confronted head-on. Yet there does not appear to be any systematic analysis of the problem, at least as formulated here, in the literature on miracles or philosophy of religion generally. I discuss ten possible solutions to the WLP on behalf of the believer in miracles. Although some are stronger than others, all but the final one seem too weak to solve the problem. It is the final one – the ‘how do you know?’ solution – that I endorse and examine in some depth. This solution, I argue, shows that the WLP does not move the epistemological dial when it comes to belief or disbelief in miracles.

'Mistakes in Action: On Clarifying the Phenomenon of Goal-Directedness', Biological Theory (2025). Jonathan Hill, David S. Oderberg, Christopher Austin, François Cinotti, Ingo Bojak, Jonathan M. Gibbins. DOI: 10.1007/s13752-025-00496-6.

Common sense tells us that biological systems are goal-directed, and yet the concept remains philosophically problematic. We propose a novel characterization of goal-directed activities as a basis for hypothesizing about and investigating explanatory mechanisms. We focus on survival goals such as providing adequate nutrition to body tissues, highlighting two key features—normativity and action. These are closely linked inasmuch as goal-directed actions must meet normative requirements such as that they occur when required and not at other times. We illustrate how goal-directed actions are initiated and terminated not by environmental features and goals themselves, but by markers for them. For example, timely blood clotting is the essential response to injury, but platelet activation, required for clotting, is initiated not by the injury itself but by a short sequence of amino acids (GPO) that provides a reliable marker for it. We then make the case that the operation of markers is a prerequisite for common biological phenomena such as mistake-proneness and mimicry. We go on to identify properties of markers in general, including those that are genetically determined and those that can be acquired through associative learning. Both provide the basis for matching actions to changing environments and hence adaptive goal-directedness. We describe how goal-directed activities such as bird nest construction and birdsong learning, completed in anticipation of actions in the environment, have to be evaluated and practiced against a standard of correctness. This characterization of goal-directedness is sufficiently detailed to provide a basis for the scientific study of mechanisms.

'Hylemorphism, the Qualitative Problem, and the Myth of Structure', Res Philosophica 102 (1) (2025): 1-18. DOI: 10.5840/resphilosophica202541133.

‘Structural hylemorphism’ holds that the concept of structure should replace the allegedly less explanatory concept of form. Adherents do not, however, give us a precise idea of what structure is meant to be, and on analysis it is difficult to know how to define it as a replacement for form. I compare and contrast classical and structural hylemorphism. I rehearse the ‘content-fixing problem’ for structuralism about form, then set out the ‘qualitative problem’. These seem insurmountable obstacles to a viable version of structural hylemorphism. Exploration of the relation between quantity and quality shows that classical form can never be reduced to/replaced by a quantitative concept of form. In the end, structure does not capture what metaphysics requires. More radically, I suggest that there is no clear concept of what structure is. Classical hylemorphism, by contrast, gives us form in full metaphysical technicolor—adequate both for science and for fundamental metaphysics.

'Getting it Wrong: Biological Mistake-Making as a Cross-System, Cross-Scale Phenomenon', (D.S. Oderberg, J. Hill, I. Bojak, J.M. Gibbins, C.J. Austin, F. Cinotti), International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 38 (2) (2025): 101-120. DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2025.2472482.

The making of mistakes by organisms and living systems generally is an underexplored way of conceptualising biology and organising experimental research. We set out an informal account of biological mistakes and why they should be taken seriously in biological investigation. We then give an indirect defence of their importance by applying the concept of mistake making to three kinds of activity: timing, calculation, and communication. We give a range of examples to show that mistakes in these kinds of behaviour can be found across a diversity of scales and systems. We also suggest ideas for empirical research that naturally arise from these cases. The reality and potential for mistake making across such a wide range of biological entities shows that it is not a purely human phenomenon. Getting it wrong seems to be central to biology as a whole, and to be a potentially productive organising principle for generating novel research questions and experimental hypotheses.

'Fear of Imprecision is the Beginning of Wisdom: Commentary on “Definitional Drift Within the Science of Forgiveness”', Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 45: 32-7.

The provocative paper ‘Definitional Drift Within the Science of Forgiveness’ challenges us to define forgiveness in a way that is precise, accurate, and instructive for therapists. I take up the challenge, drawing on the materials in ‘Definitional Drift’, adopting the Aristotelian method of definition the authors rightly commend, and using the system of binary classification handed down from Porphyry to produce a definition of forgiveness that meets this all-important challenge.

'What is Life? An Operational Definition', BioCosmos 1 (2025): 12-17.

One way of defining life is via a real definition, which gives the essence of life. Another approach is an operational definition, which shows how living things can be tested or measured in a way that is distinctive of the biological. Although I give a real definition elsewhere, in this paper I provide an operational definition, echoing Canguilhem’s dictum that life is what is capable of making mistakes. Biological mistakes are central to the behaviour of organisms, their parts and sub-systems, and the collections to which they belong. I provide an informal definition of a biological mistake. I contrast mistakes with mere failures and malfunctions. Although closely related phenomena, each is distinct. After giving some brief examples of mistake-making and how it can be tested, I reply to some objections to the very idea of a biological mistake.

'Biological Mistake Theory and the Question of Function', (D.S. Oderberg, J. Hill, C. Austin, I. Bojak, F. Cinotti, J.M. Gibbins), Philosophy of Science 2024, doi: 10.1017/psa.2024.56.

The making of mistakes by organisms and other living systems is a theoretically and empirically unifying feature of biological investigation. Mistake theory is a rigorous and experimentally productive way of understanding this widespread phenomenon. It does, however, run up against the long-standing “functions” debate in philosophy of biology. Against the objection that mistakes are just a kind of malfunction, and that without a position on functions there can be no theory of mistakes, we reply that this is to misunderstand the theory. In this paper we set out the basic concepts of mistake theory and then argue that mistakes are a distinctive phenomenon in their own right, not just a kind of malfunction. Moreover, the functions debate is, to a large degree, independent of the concept of biological mistakes we outline. In particular, although the popular selected effects theory may retain its place within a more pluralistic conception of biological function, there is also need for a more forward-looking approach, where a robust concept of normativity can be an important driver of future experimental work.

'Action, Passion, Power', Noûs 59 (2025): 567-584. DOI: 10.1111/nous.12523.

The active/passive distinction, once a hallmark of classical metaphysics, has largely been discarded from contemporary thought. The revival of powers theory has not seen an equally vigorous rehabilitation of the real distinction between active and passive powers. I begin an analysis and vindication with a critique of E.J. Lowe’s discussion. I then argue that the active/passive problem is a metaphysical one, not a logical or logico-linguistic one, and so logic is impotent to solve it. Following this is a discussion of the rights and wrongs of Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s (identical) defence of the distinction. We will see that one main part of their analysis is a bright red herring while the other part contains the solution to the problem. I then state and clarify the key Scholastic principle concerning action and passion, which I call the Fundamental Thesis – one that will appear scandalous to contemporary ears, yet from which we can derive the tools needed to understand action and passion in the right way. I end with a definition of what I call the Minimal Metaphysical Agent, where the formulation is to be understood as an epistemic criterion for identifying agent and patient in a given causal interaction.

'Biological Mistakes: What They Are and What They Mean for the Experimental Biologist', ( D.S. Oderberg, J. Hill, C. Austin, I. Bojak, F. Cinotti, J.M. Gibbins ), British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2023 , doi: 10.1086/724444.

Organisms and other biological entities are mistake-prone: they get things wrong. The entities of pure physics, such as atoms and inorganic molecules, do not make mistakes: they do what they do according to physical law, with no room for error except on the part of the physicist or their theory. We set out a novel framework for understanding biology and its demarcation from physics – that of mistake-making. We distinguish biological mistakes from mere failures. We then propose a rigorous definition of mistakes that, although invoking the concept of function, is compatible with various views about what functions are. The definition of mistake-making is agential, since mistakes do not just happen ¬– at least in the sense analysed here – but are made. This requires, then, a notion of biological agency which we set out as a definition of the Minimal Biological Agent. The paper then considers a series of objections to the theory presented here, along with our replies. Two key features of our theory of mistakes are, first, that it is a supplement to, not a replacement for, existing general frameworks within which biology is understood and practised. Secondly, it is designed to be experimentally productive. Hence we end with a series of case studies where mistake theory can be shown to be useful in the potential generation of research questions and novel hypotheses of interest to the working biologist.

'Who's Afraid of Reverse Mereological Essentialism?', Philosophical Studies (2023).

Whereas Mereological Essentialism is the thesis that the parts of an object are essential to it, Reverse Mereological Essentialism is the thesis that the whole is essential to its parts. Specifically—since RME is an Aristotelian doctrine—it is a claim not about objects in general but about substances. Here I set out and explain RME as it should be understood from the perspective of the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition, as well as proposing a kind of master argument for believing it. A number of objections (many of which have been raised by Kathrin Koslicki or Robert Koons) are then considered, the replies to which help further to clarify and motivate RME. The final section considers some important questions concerning parts and matter in light of Ross Inman’s recent defence of RME under the guise of what he calls Substantial Priority. Considering these questions further illustrates right and wrong ways of understanding RME. Overall, the case for Reverse Mereological Essentialism is strong albeit with a number of difficulties that need to be resolved through further investigation.

'Mistake-Making: A Theoretical Framework for Generating Research Questions in Biology, With Illustrative Application to Blood Clotting', The Quarterly Review of Biology 97 (2022): 2-13. DOI: 10.1086/718736.

It is a matter of contention whether or not a general explanatory framework for the biological sciences would be of scientific value, or whether it is even achievable. In this paper we suggest that both are the case, and we outline proposals for a framework capable of generating new scientific questions. Starting with one clear characteristic of biological systems—that they all have the potential to make mistakes—we aim to describe the nature of this potential and the common processes that lie behind it. Given that under most circumstances biological systems function effectively, an examination of different kinds of mistake-making provides pointers to mechanisms that must exist to make failure uncommon. This, in turn, informs a framework for systematic inquiry, which in this paper we apply to the hemostatic system, but we believe could be applied to any system across biology.

'Is Prime Matter Energy?', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (3) (2023): 534-550. DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2021.2010222.

This paper tests the hypothesis that the prime matter of classical Aristotelian-Scholastic metaphysics is numerically identical to energy. Is P = E? After outlining the classical Aristotelian concept of prime matter, I provide the master argument for it, based on the phenomenon of substantial change. I then outline what we know about energy as a scientific concept, including its role and application in some key fields. Next, I consider the arguments in favour of prime matter being identical to energy, followed by the arguments against this. The method used is that of ontological profile comparison: does the profile of prime matter match, in key features, that of energy? An affirmative answer, that P = E, would be a momentous discovery: it would show that one of the most neglected and derided ideas of pre-modern metaphysics—a contributor to its downfall in the wake of the Scientific Revolution—was correct all along. From a negative answer, we would still learn much about the interaction of science and metaphysics. It turns out, however, given what we currently know, that the answer is not quite as simple as one might hope.

'Restoring the Hierarchy of Being', in William M.R. Simpson, Robert C. Koons and James Orr (eds), Neo-Aristotelian Metaphysics and the Theology of Nature (London: Routledge, 2021): 94-124.

The idea of the Great Chain of Being was a foundation stone of philosophy from Plato to the nineteenth century. Under the onslaught of various schools of thought, the idea was eventually banished from philosophy, retreating into the corners of esotericism. The idea of an ontological hierarchy, however, merits reappraisal. Rechristening it more prosaically as the hierarchy of being and pruning it of its wilder and less plausible offshoots, we find a concept worthy of reconsideration. After surveying the historical fate of the hierarchy, focusing of the famous work of Arthur Lovejoy, and then identifying the reasons for its demise, I develop a rigorous definition of metaphysical superiority deriving from an understanding of the hierarchy as found in Aristotle and Aquinas. The definition is exemplified by cases taken from the hierarchy and defended against challenges and possible counterexamples. Having argued that my definition survives these objections, I conclude that the concept of a hierarchy of being still has much to commend it, deserving serious reconsideration and perhaps even reinstatement at the core of sound philosophy.

'Principle of Sufficient Reason', in Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro (eds) The Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Religion (Hoboken: Wiley Blackwell, 2021) (page nos. unavailable).

After giving some historical background to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, I discuss its formulation and general defense. I then show its employment in three areas. First, there is its explicit use in Leibniz's famous argument for God from contingency. Then I examine its implicit use in Aquinas's First and Second Ways. Finally, I look at its recent deployment in defense of one of the premises of the Kalām Cosmological Argument.

'The Order of Charity', Zeitschrift für Ethik und Moralphilosophie 4 (2021):337-355.

This paper defends partiality as an inherent, essential part of ethical decision-making. First, the concept of charity as a kind of universal benevolence is spelled out, drawing on key ideas in religious thinking. I then argue that any justification of partiality must appeal to the good first, rather than rights. There follows a justification of partiality via an argument from the idea of control over the good. The next section seeks to harmonize partialistic preference with universal charity, explaining the concept of love of neighbour. There follows an outline of the key principles required for setting out an order of charity based on different kinds of special relationship. While not all of this theistically driven approach to the order of charity translates easily into secular moral thought, enough does to demonstrate that the view defended is at the least coherent and not to be dismissed lightly, and at best has much in it that is commendable to secular common sense.

'Formal Causation: Accidental and Substantial', in Ludger Jansen and Petter Sandstad (eds), Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Formal Causation (London: Routledge, 2021): 40-61.

Of Aristotle’s famous four causes, the ‘formal cause’ has been arguably the most neglected, if not eliminated outright from philosophy. This paper is an attempt to contribute to the rehabilitation of formal causality. First, I outline the Aristotelian-Scholastic understanding of form as the principle of actuality, explaining the overlap between forms and universals. I then begin, unconventionally, with an explanation of formal causation by accidents . There is a kind of causation by accidental forms that cannot be equated with efficient causation: I distinguish between the efficient causal trigger of actualisation and the continued actualisation of an object’s potentiality, which latter is accounted for by formal causality. The discussion then moves to substantial forms and formal causation by them—where accounts of formal causality traditionally begin. I argue that the causality whereby there exists a hylemorphic compound of matter and form cannot be efficient but must be formal. This requires an analysis of some aspects of matter as pure potentiality— Aristotelian prime matter. I conclude by discussing the role of form as the unifier of matter into a single substance. This activity of unification is a central element in substantial formal causality. By contrast, Travis Dumsday’s attempt to solve the unity problem without appealing to form is found wanting. I conclude that formal causation, far from being the relic of an outdated metaphysic, is both coherent and necessary to a proper understanding of fundamental being.

'Siphonophores: A Metaphysical Case Study', in Anne Sophie Meincke and John Dupré (eds) Biological Identity: Perspectives from Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Biology (London: Routledge): 22-39.

Analytic metaphysics has recently discovered biology as a means of grounding metaphysical theories. This has resulted in long-standing metaphysical puzzles, suc

'How Special is Medical Conscience?', The New Bioethics 25 (2019): 207-20.

The vigorous legal and ethical debates over conscientious objection have taken place largely within the domain of health care. Is this because conscience in medicine is of a special kind, or are there other reasons why it tends to dominate these debates? Beginning with an analysis of the analogy between medical conscience and conscientious objection in wartime, I go on to examine various possible grounds for distinguishing between medicine and other professional contexts (taking law and accountancy as examples). The conclusion is that no principled difference exists between the military and medical cases, nor between the health professions and other professions. Nevertheless, there are practical reasons why medical conscience has distinctive importance, mainly concerning the rapid advance of medical technology. Medical conscience will, for these reasons, continue to drive the debate over conscientious objection, even though legal protection should in principle extend to all professions.

'On a So-Called Demonstration of the Causal Power of Absences', Studia Neoaristotelica 16 (2019): 141-8.

Tyron Goldschmidt has recently published a non-paper in which he claims to demonstrate the causal power of absences. His non-paper is, precisely, an empty page. The non-paper is ingenious and at first “glance” the “reader” might think that the absence of words on the page does prove that negative beings can literally cause states such as surprise or disappointment. Closer analysis, however, shows that Goldschmidt’s clever non-paper not only lacks words but also lacks causal power. Serious metaphysical problems pile up if we suppose otherwise.

'Death, Unity, and the Brain', Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 40 (2019): 359-79.

The dead donor rule holds that removing organs from living human beings without their consent is wrongful killing. The rule still prevails in most countries, and I assume it without argument in order to pose the question: is it possible to have a metaphysically correct, clinically relevant analysis of human death that makes organ donation ethically permissible? I argue that the two dominant criteria of death-brain death and circulatory death-are both empirically and metaphysically inadequate as definitions of human death and therefore hold no epistemic value in themselves. I first set out a neo-Aristotelian theory of death as separation of soul (understood as organising principle) and body, which is then fleshed out as loss of organismic integrity. The brain and circulatory criteria are shown to have severe weaknesses as physiological manifestations of loss of integrity. Given the mismatch between what death is, metaphysically speaking, and the dominant criteria accepted by clinicians and philosophers, it turns out that only actual bodily decomposition is a sure sign of death. In this I differ from Alan Shewmon, whose important work I discuss in detail.

'The Impossibility of Natural Necessity', in Alexander Carruth, Sophie Gibb, and John Heil (eds), Ontology, Modality, and Mind: Themes from the Metaphysics of E.J. Lowe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018): 73-92.

I build a case for the impossibility of natural necessity as anything other than a species of metaphysical necessity – the necessity obtaining in virtue of the essences of natural objects. Aristotelian necessitarianism about the laws of nature is clarified and defended. I contrast it with E.J. Lowe’s contingentism about the laws. I examine Lowe’s solution to the circularity/triviality problem besetting natural necessity understood as relative necessity. Lowe’s way out is subject to serious problems unless it is given an essentialist turn, which he declines to do. Further, his defence of contingency in terms of possible variation in the natural constants is found wanting, as is a related defence given by Kit Fine. I examine and raise problems for a recent, Lowe-inspired defence of a hybrid view of the modal status of laws given by Tuomas Tahko. Aristotelian necessitarianism, by contrast, can account for the sorts of phenomena to which contingentists typically appeal.

'The Storage Problem Revisited: Reply to Díaz', American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2018): 97-105.

I restate and sharpen the ‘storage problem’ for materialism about the human mind: how entities that are abstract, unextended, and universal – concepts and the complexes built from them – could be literally embodied, located, or stored in anything concrete, extended, and particular such as the brain. Rehearsing the ontological mismatch (abstract/concrete, unextended/extended, universal/particular), I argue that Díaz’s ‘strong’ reading misattributes to me the premise that nothing universal can be stored in anything particular, and that his worries about redundancy and explanatory burden rest on terminological and logical confusions. The upshot is that no coherent material account of concept-storage is forthcoming.

'The Great Unifier: Form and the Unity of the Organism', in William M.R. Simpson, Robert C. Koons, and Nicholas J. Teh (eds) Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Contemporary Science (New York: Routledge, 2018): 211-34.

Organisms possess a special unity that biologists have long recognized and that cries out for explanation. Organs and collectives also have their own related kinds of unity, so what distinguishes the unity of the organism? I argue that only substantial form, a central plank of hylemorphic metaphysics, can provide the explanation we need. I set out the idea that whilst organisms possess substantial form, organs abtain the substantial form of the organisms they belong to, and collectives contain the substantial forms of their organismic members. I consider a number of difficult cases, including lichens, biofilms, cellular slime moulds, and plasmodial slime moulds, arguing that none of them pose a serious threat to the threefold distinction between organ, organism, and collective. I conclude by arguing that two prominent, alternative unity principles for organisms do not work, thus giving indirect support to the need for substantial form.

'No Beginning, No Explanation: the Kalām Cosmological Argument and the Principle of Sufficient Reason', in Paul Copan and William Lane Craig (eds) The Kalām Cosmological Argument: Philosophical Arguments for the Finitude of the Past (London: Bloomsbury, 2018): 120-34.

One of the most serious problems for the idea of a beginningless past is that it would violate the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). William Lane Craig has appealed to this problem in his defence of the Kalam Cosmological Argument (KCA), and I (among others) have also done so in previous work. Critics, notably Wes Morriston, have denied that there is anything problematic here. I take up the issue again, formulating a version of PSR that is minimally sufficient for the argument against an infinite past to work. I elaborate and defend it against Morriston’s and other criticisms. None of the objections to the argument succeeds, meaning that one of the most solid supports of the KCA – an a priori argument against a beginningless past based on PSR – remains unshaken.

'Should there be Freedom of Dissociation?', Economic Affairs 37 (2017): 167-81.

Contemporary liberal societies are seeing increasing pressure on individuals to act against their consciences. Most of the pressure is directed at freedom of religion but it also affects ethical beliefs more generally, contrary to the recognition of freedom of religion and conscience as a basic human right. I propose that freedom of dissociation, as a corollary of freedom of association, could be a practical and ethically acceptable solution to the conscience problem. I examine freedom of association and explain how freedom of dissociation follows from it, showing how dissociation protects freedom of religion and conscience. Extreme cases, such as the problem of the Satanist nurse, can be handled within a dissociationist framework, so it is reasonable to think less extreme cases can also be dealt with. The serious objection that dissociationism entails unjust discrimination is answered primarily by appeal to the need for ‘full and fair access’ to goods and services by all groups. I then allay important concerns about what kind of liberal society we should want to live in. Next, I refute the charge that a dissociationist society violates liberalism's ‘higher good’, arguing that liberalism strictly does not have a higher good. I conclude with some reflections on what a dissociationist society might look like.

'Co-operation in the Age of Hobby Lobby : When Sincerity is Not Enough', Expositions 11 (2017): 15-30.

I argue that contemporary Hobby Lobby-style litigation exposes a structural mistake in how courts treat conscientious objection: sincerity is not enough. Using the moral taxonomy of co-operation (formal vs material; proximate vs remote; indispensable vs dispensable) and the doctrine of double effect, I claim that some compelled actions really do constitute illicit material co-operation (e.g. purchasing abortion coverage), whereas others – paradigmatically the ‘opt-out’ paperwork in Zubik / Little Sisters – do not amount to co-operation at all. The jurisprudential trouble begins when courts treat an objector’s belief about complicity as itself a protected religious belief immune from objective assessment, thereby inviting incoherence and arbitrariness in Religious Freedom Restoration Act adjudication.

'Further Clarity on Cooperation and Morality', Journal of Medical Ethics 43 (2017): 192-200 (Editor's Choice).

I explore the increasingly important issue of cooperation in immoral actions, particularly in connection with healthcare. Conscientious objection, especially as pertains to religious freedom in healthcare, has become a pressing issue in the light of the US Supreme Court judgement in Hobby Lobby Section 'Moral evaluation using the basic principles of cooperation' outlines a theory of cooperation inspired by Catholic moral theologians such as those cited by the court. The theory has independent plausibility and is at least worthy of serious consideration-in part because it is an instance of double-effect reasoning, which is also independently plausible despite its association with moral theology. Section 'Case study: Burwell v. Hobby Lobby ' examines Hobby Lobby in detail. Even if the judgement was correct in that case the reasoning was not, as it involved applying a 'mere sincerity' test to the cooperation question. The mere sincerity test leads to absurd consequences, whereas a reasonableness test applied using the theory of cooperation defended here would avoid absurdity. Section 'A question of remoteness: "accommodations" and opt-outs' explores the post- Hobby Lobby problem further, examining opt-outs and accommodations: the Little Sisters of the Poor case shows how opt-outs are misunderstood on a mere sincerity test, which the court rightly rejected. Section 'Application to the medical field: Doogan and Wood ' discusses the UK case of Doogan and Wood , concerning participation in abortion. Again, a judicially recognised ethic of cooperation, if it were part of the fabric of legal reasoning in such cases, would have enabled the conscientious objectors in this and similar situations to have their freedom of conscience and religion respected in a way that it currently is not.

'Finality Revived: Powers and Intentionality', Synthese 194 (2017): 2387-2425.

Proponents of physical intentionality argue that the classic hallmarks of intentionality highlighted by Brentano are also found in purely physical powers. Critics worry that this idea is metaphysically obscure at best, and at worst leads to panpsychism or animism. I examine the debate in detail, finding both confusion and illumination in the physical intentionalist thesis. Analysing a number of the canonical features of intentionality, I show that they all point to one overarching phenomenon of which both the mental and the physical are kinds, namely finality. This is the finality of ‘final causes’, the long-discarded idea of universal action for an end to which recent proponents of physical intentionality are in fact pointing whether or not they realise it. I explain finality in terms of the concept of specific indifference, arguing that in the case of the mental, specific indifference is realised by the process of abstraction, which has no correlate in the case of physical powers. This analysis, I conclude, reveals both the strength and weakness of rational creatures such as us, as well as demystifying (albeit only partly) the way in which powers work.

'Divine Premotion', International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 79 (2016): 207-222.

According to divine premotionism, God does not merely create and sustain the universe. He also moves all secondary causes to action as instruments without undermining their intrinsic causal efficacy. I explain and uphold the premotionist theory, which is the theory of St Thomas Aquinas and his most prominent exponents. I defend the premotionist interpretation of Aquinas in some textual detail, with particular reference to Suarez and to a recent paper by Louis Mancha. Critics, including Molinists and Suarezians, raise various objections to the view that premotion is compatible with genuine secondary causation. I rebut a number of these objections, in the course of which I respond to the central challenge that premotionism destroys free will. I also offer a number of positive reasons for embracing the premotionist theory.

'Religion and Normative Ethics', in G. Oppy (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion (London: Routledge, 2015): 316-28.

This chapter investigates the relation between religion and normative ethics. For most of human history people have thought that morality needed a religious or theistic foundation, something modern secularism finds wrong at best, incoherent at worst. Yet morality seems to have a grip and pervasiveness in our lives that makes purely naturalistic explanations look unconvincing. The objective demands of morality seem to come from outside ourselves yet also to require a foundation that goes beyond the contingency of worldly circumstance. One aspect of this is the rational requirement of what I have called 'cosmic justice', without which, as George Mavrodes argues, morality would itself be absurd. Another aspect is the Kantian idea of God as a 'regulative ideal' for morality. Yet Kant's argument is flawed, as Linda Zagzebski argues; I argue that her own anti-sceptical version of the Kantian approach is equally implausible. My argument for a theistic foundation, based on the objection that morality would otherwise be pointless and futile given how demanding and inescapable it is, deserves more attention. I also refute the charge that a religiously-grounded morality makes moral motivation selfish.

'All for the Good', Philosophical Investigations 38 (2015): 72-95.

The Guise of the Good thesis has received much attention since Anscombe’s brief defence in her book Intention. I approach it here from a less common perspective - indirectly, via a theory explaining how it is that moral behaviour is even possible. After setting out how morality requires the employment of a fundamental test, I argue that moral behaviour involves orientation toward the good. Immoral behaviour cannot, however, involve orientation to evil as such, given the theory of evil as privation. There must always be orientation to good of some kind for immorality even to be possible. Evil can, nevertheless, be intended, but this must be carefully understood in terms of the metaphysic of good and evil I set out. Given that metaphysic, the Guise of the Good is a virtual corollary.

'Being and Goodness', American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2014): 345-356.

The article defends the scholastic principle of the convertibility of being and goodness. First, it identifies the non-moral sense of ‘good’ as the fulfilment of appetite, where appetites are the natural tendencies of objects, whether living or non-living, to or away from certain end states. The good, in its primary meaning, applies to all cases in which some appetite is fulfilled. The article then analyses a central case of inorganic fulfilment, centred on the idea of instantiation – in particular, being a good example of some geometrical kind. It argues that the goodness in a case of instantiation, where there is a standard to be met, is an irreducible kind of goodness. Next, the article argues that continuation in existence is also a kind of fulfilment of appetite possessed by all enduring things. The primary counterexample involves radioactive decay: the article deflects this counterexample by showing that it does not undermine the idea that every enduring object has a tendency to continue in existence. Once we appreciate the place of appetite fulfilment across the natural world, we are more easily able to understand organic fulfilment – goodness for a thing. Without a kind-neutral concept of goodness that applies to all being, organic goodness is far more difficult to account for.

'Could There Be a Superhuman Species?', The Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (2014): 206-226.

Transhumanism is the school of thought that advocates the use of technology to enhance the human species, to the point where some supporters consider that a new species altogether could arise. Even some critics think this at least a technological possibility. Some supporters also believe the emergence of a new, improved, superhuman species raises no special ethical questions. Through an examination of the metaphysics of species, and an analysis of the essence of the human species, I argue that the existence of an embodied, genuinely superhuman species is a metaphysical impossibility. Finally, I point out an interesting ethical consideration that this metaphysical truth raises.

'The Metaphysics of Privation', in R. Hüntelmann and J. Hattler (eds), New Scholasticism Meets Analytic Philosophy (Heusenstamm: Editiones Scholasticae, 2014): 63-88.

In this paper I defend the theory of evil as a privation of good. I distinguish between privations and mere absences, then consider both the totality and exclusion accounts of truthmakers for negative truths. The totality account is less promising than the exclusion account especially as concerns privative truths, but any account involving positive states as partially responsible for the truth of a privative must invoke needs, and more generally the potencies that make needs possible. I propose a conjunctive analysis of privation, whereby it involves both an absence and a need. Since privations are partly negative they cannot be real causes or effects, but this does not make them illusory either. Privations (and hence evils) are conceptual beings with a foundation in positive reality.

'Is Form Structure?', in D.D. Novotný and L. Novák (eds) Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives in Metaphysics (London: Routledge, 2014): 164-80.

Hylemorphism is the central theory of Aristotelian and Scholastic metaphysics - the fundamental distinction between form and matter. In recent work, Kathrin Koslicki has sought to reinterpret the form/matter distinction for contemporary philosophy as a distinction between structure and content. Her idea is that wherever Aristotelians have spoken of form they can and should speak of structure, and instead of matter they should talk about the content that is structured. This is a highly suggestive interpretation that raises a number of important issues. In this chapter I explain Koslicki’s approach, finding significant differences between the role of structure and the role of form as traditionally understood. I argue that a central problem, which I call the ‘content-fixing problem’, fatally undermines any attempt to explicate form in terms of structure. Material substances, for the hylemorphist, have only one substantial form each. By contrast, there is no way in principle of singling out the structure that configures content, because there is no way of singling out the content. I conclude that despite its initial appeal, structure cannot be a replacement for the traditional conception of form.

'The Morality of Reputation and the Judgment of Others', Journal of Practical Ethics 1 (2013): 3-33.

There is a tension between the reasonable desire not to be judgmental of other people’s behaviour or character, and the moral necessity of making negative judgments in some cases. I sketch a way in which we might accommodate both, via an evaluation of the good of reputation and the ethics of judgment of other people’s character and behaviour. I argue that a good reputation is a highly valuable good for its bearer, akin to a property right, and not to be damaged without serious reason deriving from the demands of justice and the common welfare. Rash judgment wrongfully damages reputation and is sometimes a seriously immoral act. Rashness is not merely about lack of evidence, but involves lack of charity and is to be avoided even in some cases where the evidence of bad character or action is epistemically sufficient for judgment. I argue that the desirability of a good name for its holder, whether the reputation is deserved or not, means that in all but a relatively narrow range of cases it is always wrong to think badly of someone, even if they are bad.

'Synthetic Life and the Bruteness of Immanent Causation', in E. Feser (ed.) Aristotle on Method and Metaphysics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013): 206-35.

When Craig Venter announced, in 2010, the production of a bacterium with a synthetic genome, the reaction in the media was typically hyperbolic. Headlines screamed that scientists at the J. Craig Venter Institute had created "synthetic life",1 a "synthetic life form",2 "artificial life",3 with the use of the word "creation" sprinkled liberally across the front pages. The prize for compacting as much hyperbole as possible into the shortest space went, as so often, to the Daily Mail: "Scientist accused of playing God after creating artificial life by making designer microbe from scratch — but could it wipe out humanity?"

'Natural Law and Rights Theory', in G. Gaus and F. D'Agostino (eds) The Routledge Companion to Social and Political Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2013): 375-86.

I defend a classical natural law account on which morality is grounded in an essentialist and teleological human nature: our powers have intrinsic ends, and human flourishing consists in the successful pursuit of objective basic goods. Because agents are rationally bound to pursue these goods, I argue that natural rights arise as moral powers protecting that pursuit – not as discretionary ‘permissions’, but often as non-discretionary rights correlative with duties (e.g. a right to life without any right to self-destruction). I emphasise three features of such rights: inviolability, coaction (defensive enforceability), and limitation by other rights and by the common good. I then sketch the social and political upshot: a layered associational order, subsidiarity, and a state ordered to the common good rather than liberal neutrality.

'Survivalism, Corruptionism, and Mereology', European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (2012): 1-26.

Corruptionism is the view that following physical death, the human being ceases to exist (until resurrection) but their soul persists in the afterlife. Survivalism holds that both the human being and their soul persist in the afterlife, as distinct entities, with the soul constituting the human. Each position has its defenders, most of whom appeal both to metaphysical considerations and to the authority of St Thomas Aquinas. Corruptionists claim that survivalism violates a basic principle of any plausible mereology, while survivalists tend to reject the principle, though without as much detail as one would like. In this paper I examine both the key exegetical issues and the mereological question, arguing (i) that Aquinas cannot be shown to have supported the principle in question, and (ii) that the principle should be rejected on independent grounds. If correct, some key planks in support of survivalism are established, with others to await further examination.

'Hume, the Occult, and the Substance of the School', Metaphysica 13 (2012): 155-74.

I have not been able to locate any critique of Hume on substance by a Schoolman, at least in English, dating from Hume's period or shortly thereafter. I have, therefore, constructed my own critique as an exercise in ‘post facto history’. This is what a late eighteenth-century/early nineteenth-century Scholastic could, would, and should have said in response to Hume's attack on substance should they have been minded to do so. That no one did is somewhat mysterious. My critique is precisely in the language of the period, using solely the conceptual resources available to a Schoolman at that time. The arguments, however, are as sound now as they were then, and in this sense the paper performs a dual role– contributing to the defence of substance contra Hume, and filling, albeit two hundred years or so too late, a gap in the historical record.

'No Potency without Actuality: The Case of Graph Theory', in Tuomas E. Tahko (ed.) Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012): 207-28.

Everything in the material universe is a mixture of act and potency. But the conclusion the author draws from his analysis of Alexander Bird and Randall Dipert seems a deal weaker, namely that if potency exists, so must actuality, but not necessarily wherever the potency is. In the infinite case, with a fairly narrow class of linear chains of directed edges, it might be possible for one to avoid any circularity at all and simply require a terminal actuality to preserve identity conditions all the way up the chain. To this the author makes the dialectical reply that the thesis of no potency without actuality has far more to be said in its favour than that the world is anything like the kind of restrictive, linear, directed infinite graph just supposed.

'Graph Structuralism and its Discontents: Rejoinder to Shackel', Analysis 72 (2012): 94-8.

I argue that graph-theoretic structuralism faces a dilemma once identity conditions are taken to be wholly relational. If deleting an edge symmetrises a graph, the structuralist must either accept the non-existence of previously distinct nodes or accept their numerical identification – but the latter, I claim, amounts to denying the necessity of distinctness, and so undermines the necessity of identity as well. Attempts to escape by necessitarianism or four-dimensionalism merely relocate the absurdity: either any change becomes extinction, or it becomes necessary that replacement individuals occur at highly specific times to preserve asymmetry. I extend the worry to Bird’s potency structuralism, arguing that without implausible cross-temporal existence principles or ad hoc guarantees of appropriately timed bearers, the universe risks grinding to a halt.

'Disembodied Communication and Religious Experience: The Online Model', Philosophy and Technology 25 (2012): 381-97.

The idea of disembodied communication has received widespread discussion in the context of the various kinds of online interaction. Electronic mail is probably the purest form of text-based communication where interlocutors are present in mind rather than body. I argue that this online model provides a way of understanding and defending the possibility of a certain kind of public religious experience, contra the many critics of the very coherence of genuine religious experience. I introduce the concept of ‘telic possibility’, a specific kind of modality, applying it to e-mail. I argue that we can reasonably move from the telic possibility of disembodied communication in mundane e-mail exchanges to the epistemic possibility of communication from a divine being in cases where the content of the messages is sufficiently extraordinary.

'Essence and Properties', Erkenntnis 75 (2011): 85-111.

The distinction between the essence of an object and its properties has been obscured in contemporary discussion of essentialism. Locke held that the properties of an object are exclusively those features that ‘flow’ from its essence. Here he follows the Aristotelian theory, leaving aside Locke’s own scepticism about the knowability of essence. I defend the need to distinguish sharply between essence and properties, arguing that essence must be given by form and that properties flow from form. I give a precise definition of what the term of art ‘flow’ amounts to, and apply the distinction to various kinds of taxonomic issues.

'Morality, Religion, and Cosmic Justice', Philosophical Investigations 34 (2011): 189-213. (Invited contribution to special issue on the theme 'Ethics and Religion'.).

I argue for a connection between morality and religion on the basis of a need for cosmic justice – a comprehensive system of rewards and punishments for good and bad behaviour, respectively. I set out the Argument for Cosmic Justice, discussing the nature of reward and punishment and how they differ from mere benefit and loss. A world without cosmic justice would be absurd and unacceptable to anyone who takes morality seriously in the way identified by George Mavrodes. I also consider a number of objections to the argument.

'The World is not an Asymmetric Graph', Analysis 71 (2011): 3-10.

Randall Dipert argues in an important 1997 article that, for the first time in the history of philosophy, the world can be proven to be a pure structure of relations, i.e. that all that exists is relational in nature. Alexander Bird has applied the same mathematical technique used by Dipert, namely the theory of asymmetric graphs, to argue that at the ‘fundamental level’ there exist only pure powers, all relationally defined. I argue that both positions are subject to counterintuitive consequences concerning existence and identity that make it unreasonable to believe the world, in its entirety or at the fundamental level, is identical to an asymmetric graph.

'The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Law', in H. Zaborowski (ed.), Natural Moral Law in Contemporary Society (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2010): 44-75.

Natural law theory, classically understood, has a robust metaphysical foundation centred on the idea of cosmic order. This is not just an order within human nature but also one that structures the entire world, thereby making it possible for humans to act morally. Cosmic order is both intrinsic and necessary. Randomness is either purely epistemic, or else an objective but relative phenomenon defined by the grade or level of order against which it is compared. There is, however, a deep conceptual connection between order and ordinance - between law and lawgiver. All laws require law-givers, and even if the law is a metaphysical fact about the intrinsic nature of the world rather than a mere act of will, it requires imposition on the world by a lawgiver. Several arguments are advanced for this view. Natural law theory, then, requires the extrinsic ordination of all the laws of nature, of which the natural moral laws are but a part. But when it comes to morality, an essentialist metaphysic of human nature takes centre stage. In defending human nature essentialism, we uncover the flaws in the so-called ‘new’ natural law theory of Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle.

'The Doctrine of Double Effect', in T. O'Connor and C. Sandis (eds), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010): 324-330.

This is an outline of one of the most famous principles of moral reasoning, equally defended and strongly criticised for centuries. It is a cornerstone of Catholic moral theology, but is arguably central to any moral philosophy that takes the doing of good and the avoidance of evil to be paramount. How is it possible both to do good and avoid evil given that much of what we do has both good and bad results? DDE is a codification of the rules governing such actions. It allows the doing of good and evil in certain cases, but forbids it in others. I set out the rules comprised by DDE, looking at each in turn with application to examples. Many of the criticisms of the doctrine are based on simple misunderstandings of what it does and does not say, so I provide important clarifications. I also take on some of the more substantive criticisms, showing how the defender of DDE can respond to them.

'"Whatever is Changing is Being Changed by Something Else": A Reappraisal of Premise One of the First Way', in J. Cottingham and P. Hacker (eds) Mind, Method and Morality: Essays in Honour of Anthony Kenny (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 140-64.

I defend Aquinas’s first premise in the First Way – that whatever is changing is being changed by something else – against Anthony Kenny’s influential objections. I argue that the premise is not hostage to ‘outdated cosmology’ and that familiar counterexamples (self-motion, inertia, ‘kingmakers’, heat by friction, appeal to ‘laws of nature’) trade on confusions about what does the actualising. Change, on the Thomistic analysis, is the reduction of potency to act: mere potentialities do not actualise themselves, nor do they actualise other potentialities. Once we treat actualities as including accidents as well as substances, the first premise emerges as both plausible and resilient – and

'Persistence', in J. Kim, E. Sosa, and G. Rosenkrantz (eds), A Companion to Metaphysics, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009): 55-65.

This article surveys the key issues in the contemporary metaphysical debate about persistence. First, the classic spatio-temporal continuity account is outlined and questions raised. Then the four-dimensionalist temporal part theory is sketched and subjected to critique. A more exotic temporal-parts variant called ‘stage theory’ or ‘exdurance’ is described, with serious worries suggested for it. The theory of endurance is then presented as a more appealing approach albeit not without its own issues. Finally, the ‘problem of temporary intrinsics’ is set out and the question broached of whether it is primarily a metaphysical or a semantic problem. Although the suggestion is that it is largely metaphysical, a semantic proposal - ‘sententialism’ - is suggested for dealing with the semantic concerns.

'The Non-Identity of the Categorical and the Dispositional', Analysis 69 (2009): 677-684.

This article is a response to Galen Strawson’s ‘The Identity of the Categorical and the Dispositional’ in Analysis 68 (2008):271-82. There, Strawson argues that there is no real distinction between dispositional and categorical properties and no real distinction between ‘an object and its propertiedness’. I argue that Strawson is wrong on several counts. First, he is mistaken to think that the inseparability of two things entails their identity: real distinctions do not entail separability, so the inseparability of the dispositional and the categorical does not mean they are identical. Secondly, his claim that ‘all being is actual being’, so there is no real distinction between the actual and the potential, misconceives the distinction between actuality and potentiality and involves a number of other misinterpretations of what the believer in real potentiality asserts. Thirdly, he is wrong to claim that there is no real distinction between ‘an object and its propertiedness’. Such a claim fails even if one appeals, as he does, to temporal parts theory. But it also fails on more plausible understandings of what it is to be a bearer of properties.

'The Metaphysical Status of the Embryo: Some Arguments Revisited', Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (2008): 263-76. Ingmar Persson replies to this in ‘The Origination of a Human Being: A Reply to Oderberg’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (2009): 371-8. .

This paper re‐examines some well‐known and commonly accepted arguments for the non‐individuality of the embryo, due mainly to the work of John Harris. The first concerns the alleged non‐differentiation of the embryoblast from the trophoblast. The second concerns monozygotic twinning and the relevance of the primitive streak. The third concerns the totipotency of the cells of the early embryo. I argue that on a proper analysis of both the empirical facts of embryological development, and the metaphysical importance or otherwise of those facts, all three arguments are found wanting. None of them establishes that the embryo is not an individual human being from the moment of conception.

'Concepts, Dualism, and the Human Intellect', in A. Antonietti, A. Corradini, and E.J. Lowe (eds) Psycho-Physical Dualism Today: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books/Rowman and Littlefied, 2008): 211-33.

I argue for an Aristotelian-Thomistic ('hylemorphic') route to dualism that avoids the usual phenomenological and first-personal starting points by focusing instead on the activity of reason. The core claim is that concept-acquisition requires abstraction: the intellect grasps universals as 'abstracted entities' apt to serve as the matter of judgement and inference, not mere capacities, inferential roles, or type-token representations. This yields the 'storage problem' for materialism: concepts are abstract, unextended, and universal, whereas any neural locus is concrete, extended, and particular - an ontological mismatch that no increase in neuroscientific detail can remove. I extend the difficulty via semantically simple concepts and the intellect's potential infinity, and I close by distinguishing conceptual thought from sensation, which admits a type-token story without comparable mismatch.

'Self-Love, Love of Neighbour, and Impartiality', in N. Athanassoulis and S. Vice (eds), The Moral Life: Essays in Honour of John Cottingham (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008): 58-84.

In an important and widely discussed series of papers, John Cottingham has defended a ‘partialist’ ethic against supporters of ‘impartialism’.1 The main theme of these papers is that what have come to be called particularistic obligations and permissions based on special relationships are the ineradicable and justified core of morality. These special relationships are said to begin with one’s relationship to oneself – self-love, or philautia to use the Aristotelian term employed by Cottingham.2 They then radiate outwards, to family, friends, and other social and communal groupings such as associations of various kinds (professional, recreational, and the like), geographical and political communities (civic bodies, one’s country), and ultimately to all of humanity.3

'Teleology: Inorganic and Organic', in A.M. González (ed.), Contemporary Perspectives on Natural Law (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008): 259-79.

This chapter assumes, rather than argue for, teleology in the organic world. It examines the extent to which teleology can also be found in the inorganic world. It is essential to mark the differences between organic and inorganic teleology so as to bring both into relief. It was the mistaken assumption that teleology as found in the organic world was transferable holus-bolus to the world of the non-living, that played such a large part in sparking the anti-teleological revolt. The chapter explains some select phenomena of the inorganic world; one can find teleology there as well. It adds some stones to the foundation upon which organic teleology itself is built, and the ethical theory which reposes on that. One might simply appeal to the fact that the water and rock cycles are systems. The contrast between the two is stark, yet the existence of both militates against a Cartesian-style dichotomizing of the universe.

'The Cosmological Argument', in C. Meister and P. Copan (eds) The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Religion (London: Routledge, 2007): 341-50.

I survey the principal families of cosmological argument, insisting that there is no single 'cosmological argument' but a cluster of related strategies from motion, causation, contingency, and temporal finitude. I defend a Thomistic 'master argument' that amalgamates the First and Second Ways: even if the universe were temporally infinite, any essentially ordered causal series operative now cannot regress infinitely, and so must terminate in an uncaused cause - a first mover or first efficient cause. I distinguish essential from accidental series to block the familiar objection that an infinite past would suffice. I then consider the argument from contingency, including appeals to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and finally sketch the kalam argument from the impossibility of an actual infinite. I conclude that contemporary debates have neglected the Thomistic options, and that cosmological reasoning need not be tied to outdated cosmology.

'Instantaneous Change without Instants', in C. Paterson and M.S. Pugh (eds) Analytical Thomism: Traditions in Dialogue (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006): 101-18.

I argue that instantaneous change is intelligible only if we reject the idea that time is literally composed of durationless instants. Change, understood in Aristotelian terms as the reduction of potency to act, requires a subject, an agent, and a genuine transition; but if instants are taken as actual constituents of time, Zeno-style paradoxes reappear and 'instantaneous' change collapses into incoherent talk of contraries co-existing or of gaps in being. I therefore treat instants as limit-concepts - potential termini of infinite division - and model them in terms of nested intervals. The larger moral is a unity of potentiality in time and in change.

'Artificial Reproduction, the "Welfare Principle", and the Common Good', (with J.A. Laing) , Medical Law Review 13 (2005): 328-56.

This article challenges the view most recently expounded by Emily Jackson that ‘decisional privacy’ ought to be respected in the realm of artificial reproduction (AR). On this view, it is considered an unjust infringement of individual liberty for the state to interfere with individual or group freedom artificially to produce a child. It is our contention that a proper evaluation of AR and of the relevance of welfare will be sensitive not only to the rights of ‘commissioning parties’ to AR but also to public policy considerations. We argue that AR has implications for the common good, by involving matters of human reproduction, kinship, race, parenthood and identity. In this paper we challenge presuppositions concerning decisional privacy. We examine the essential commodification of human life implicit in AR and the systematicity that makes this possible. We address the objection that it is an ethically neutral way of having children and consider the problem of ‘existential debt’. After examining objections to the thesis that AR is illegitimate for reasons of public policy and the common good, we return to the issue of decisional privacy in the light of considerations concerning the legitimate role of the state in matters affecting human reproduction.

'Towards a Natural Law Critique of Genetic Engineering', in N. Athanassoulis (ed.), Philosophical Reflections on Medical Ethics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005): 109-134.

Applied ethics is dominated by consequentialist thinking. Other theories, such as rights-based ones, have a lesser presence. Pragmatism is common, usually tied to loose consequentialist ideas. Natural law theory, however, has been conspicuously absent from debate. Genetic engineering is a prime example of a subject to which natural law theory has so far made little contribution. I examine and expose the misunderstandings of the concept of the natural that have led many applied ethicists to think natural law theory discredited. I outline some key features of the theory, contrasting it with consequentialism, and set out some of the objectionable practices to which the latter is committed when it comes to genetics in general and reproductive technology in particular. I go on to argue that whilst natural law theory cannot rule out all forms of genetic engineering, still it can provide a radical critique of certain kinds of intervention in the natural world based on the distorted manner of living to which many societies and individuals are prone.

'Hylemorphic Dualism', in E.F. Paul, F.D. Miller, and J. Paul (eds) Personal Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005): 70-99. (Originally in Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2005): 70-99.).

Despite the fact that it continues to have followers, and that it can be said to have enjoyed something of a micro-revival in recent years, dualism either in the philosophy of mind or in the theory of personal identity persists in being more the object of ridicule than of serious rational engagement. It is held by the vast majority of philosophers to be anything from (and not mutually exclusively) false, mysterious, and bizarre, to obscurantist, unintelligible, and/or dangerous to morals. Its adherents are assumed to be biased, scientifically ill-informed, motivated by prior theological dogma, cursed by metaphysical anachronism, and/or to have taken leave of their senses. Dualists who otherwise appear relatively sane in their philosophical writings are often treated with a certain benign, quasi-parental indulgence.

'Predicate Logic and Bare Particulars', in D.S. Oderberg (ed.) The Old New Logic: Essays on the Philosophy of Fred Sommers (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005): 183-210.

Modern predicate logic (MPL), on the Quinean interpretation, carries a hidden metaphysical commitment to bare particulars - essentially featureless objects that serve as the ultimate bearers of predication. This paper traces that commitment through MPL's treatment of variables as the vehicle of pure objective reference, its elimination of names in favour of predicates, its collapse of ontological categories into a single undifferentiated domain, and its assimilation of term negation to sentence negation. By contrast, traditional term functor logic (TFL), as developed by Fred Sommers, eschews ontic explicitness in its syntax, leaving room for a genuine multicategory ontology. The paper concludes by raising three fundamental difficulties for bare particulars: their inability to ground plurality; the obscurity of their individuative role; and a dilemma showing that they cannot perform even the minimal individuative work they are posited to do.

'The Structure and Content of the Good', in D.S. Oderberg and T. Chappell (eds), Human Values: New Essays on Ethics and Natural Law (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004): 127-165; rev. ed. (p/back) 2008.

There are two methodologically distinct but complementary ways of approaching natural law theory. One is a mainly agent-centred approach, focusing on practical reasoning and the intelligibility of action, paying attention to human tendencies and inclinations. The other, more traditional and mainly world-centred approach, focuses on the metaphysics of the good by means of an analysis of human nature and human faculties, and of the way in which the good must be structured for it to be an object of human pursuit, more specifically, a foundation for moral decision- making. In this paper I take a primarily world-centred approach to fundamental questions of content and structure. First, looking at some typical examples from natural law theorists of lists of the basic goods, I analyse various members that they have proposed to see what the correct list must contain. Next, I look at questions concerning how the natural law must be structured, in particular whether the list of basic goods is finite, whether there is a supreme or superordinate good, and what kinds of hierarchical relations within and across goods must exist in order for the basic goods to serve as a foundation for practical reasoning about morality. The general conclusions I draw are, first, that ontology must be taken seriously, and miscategorization avoided, when identifying basic goods; secondly, that the structure of the good requires a system of principles enabling various kinds of comparative judgment within and across goods, in order for natural law theory to serve as a basis for guiding concrete moral decisions.

'The Beginning of Existence', International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2003): 145-157.

Central to recent debate over the Kalam Cosmological Argument, and over the origin of the universe in general, has been the issue of whether the universe began to exist, and if so how this is to be understood. Adolf Grünbaum has used two cosmological models as a basis for arguing that the universe did not begin to exist according to either of them. In this paper I argue that he is wrong on both counts, concentrating on the second, “open interval” model. I give metaphysical considerations for rejecting Grünbaum’s interpretation, and offer a definition of the beginning of existence of an object which improves on prior formulations and which is adequate to show how the universe can indeed be seen to have begun to exist. I conclude with more general metaphysical discussion of the beginning of the universe and of the Kalam Cosmological Argument.

'Temporal Parts and the Possibility of Change', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2004): 686-708.

Things change. If anything counts as a datum of metaphysics, that does. Hence any correct theory of persistence must be consistent with the existence of change. Yet temporal part theory, alias four-dimensionalism, does not satisfy this basic requirement. First I outline the theory in its standard form. I then show why, contra Mark Heller, there can be no argument for temporal parts based on the Indiscernibility of Identicals, which itself presupposes facts of identity rather than grounds them. Nor does David Lewis's so-called 'problem of temporary intrinsics' give any support to four-dimensionalism. As far as the semantics of change goes, I advocate (as against adverbialism and relationalism) 'sententialism': temporal expressions such as 'at t' or 'from t1 to t2' operate on whole sentences and may not be dropped from sentences expressing change without thereby entailing contradiction. Finally, although not every argument for the inconsistency of four-dimensionalism and change succeeds, I argue, via a discussion of Lombard and van Inwagen, that there is indeed such an inconsistency: temporal part theory is a replacement theory, whereby nothing ever does, literally, change.

'The Ethics of Co-operation in Wrongdoing', in A. O'Hear (ed.), Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004; Royal Institute of Philosophy Annual Lecture Series 2002-3): 203-227.

The ethics of co-operation in another's wrongdoing is an under-explored area of moral philosophy. Yet co-operation is pervasive throughout the world of action and its evaluation is a specialized area of ethics. It is a test of any normative moral theory that it possess the conceptual tools for analysing cases of co-operation and yielding persuasive moral judgments about them. This paper sets out a theory of co-operation based on traditional moral categories derived from the natural law. First I distinguish kinds of co-operation. Then I discuss the lawfulness of co-operation, focusing on the crucial distinction between formal and material co-operation. The former is always wrong; the latter is sometimes permissible. Discussion of concrete cases shows how the relevant principles are to be applied. Analysis also reveals that the employment of those principles involves nothing other

than the application of the famous Principle of Double Effect. That the ethics of co-operation is but a special case of PDE constitutes indirect evidence of the plausibility of double effect reasoning. Moreover, the subtlety of the questions involved precludes anything like a consequentialist theory's being of any use in solving problems of co-operation.

'Intelligibility and Intensionality', Acta Analytica 28 (2002): 171-178.

A common argumentative strategy employed by anti-reductionists involves claiming that one kind of entity cannot be identified with or reduced to a second because what can intelligibly be predicated of one cannot be predicated intelligibly of the other. For instance, it might be argued that mind and brain are not identical because it makes sense to say that minds are rational but it does not make sense to say that brains are rational. The scope and power of this kind of argument – if valid – are obvious; but if it turns out that ‘It makes sense to say that…’ creates an opaque context, such arguments will fail. I analyse a possible counterexample to validity and show that it is not conclusive, as it depends on what syntactical construction is given to the premises. This leads to the general observation that the argument form under consideration works for some constructions but not others, and thus to the conclusion that further analysis of intelligibility is called for before it can be known whether the argumentative strategy is open to the anti-reductionist or not.

'The Tristram Shandy Paradox: A Reply to Graham Oppy', Philosophia Christi 4 (2002): 353-356.

Here I reply point by point to Graham Oppy's critique of the first part of my paper, 'Traversal of the Infinite, the "Big Bang" and the Kalam Cosmological Argument', arguing that none of his criticisms are sound. (Oppy's critique is 'The Tristram Shandy Paradox: A Response to David S. Oderberg', Philosophia Christi 4 (2002) 335-49.)

'Traversal of the Infinite, the "Big Bang" and the Kalam Cosmological Argument', Philosophia Christi 4 (2002): 305-336.

Debate over the Kalam Cosmological Argument (KCA) has flourished in recent years due to the impressive work of William Lane Craig. The basic argument - that the universe has a cause (viz. God) because the universe began to exist and whatever begins to exist has a cause of its beginning to exist - has excited vigorous criticism on various fronts. The aim of this paper is twofold: (a) to survey and evaluate that aspect of the KCA which relies on the claim that the universe as actual infinite cannot be formed by successive addition (i.e. cannot be 'traversed'); (b) to survey and evaluate that aspect of the argument which relies on the claim that whatever begins to exist must have a cause of the beginning of its existence. I canvass and refute criticisms of both claims, providing positive arguments to show that the claims are true. On both scores, then, the KCA stands unrefuted.

'Hylomorphism and Individuation', in J. Haldane (ed.) Mind, Metaphysics, and Value in the Thomistic and Analytical Traditions (University of Notre Dame Press, 2002: 125-42).

The Thomistic doctrine that designated matter (materia signata) is the principle of individuation of material substances is defended and refined against a range of objections. After eliminating prime matter, determinate quantity, substantial form, and existence as viable candidates, the paper argues that matter designated by indeterminate quantity - understood to encompass temporal as well as spatial dimensionality - is the chief intrinsic principle by which the composite substance is individuated. Drawing on Kit Fine's puzzles concerning Socrates and Callias, and adapting his notion of Relative Composition, the paper argues that two substances of the same kind cannot share their matter at the same time, and that temporal indexing plays a decisive role in individuation. The principle of individuation is carefully distinguished from the separate principle of diachronic identity. I resolve apparent circularity objections and explain why variation in a substance's dimensions over time poses no threat to the Thomistic account.

'How to Win Essence Back from Essentialists', Philosophical Writings (Autumn 2001): 27-45.

For all the attention given to the revival of essentialism based on the work of Plantinga, Kripke, Putnam and others, what we have really seen is the coming to prominence of an ontologically thin, unsystematic set of ideas with little theoretical cohesion or metaphysical underpinning, motivated primarily by considerations in modal logic and philosophy of language. I contrast contemporary essentialism of this kind with a metaphysically more robust, neo-Aristotelian or 'real' essentialism which attributes real essences to kinds of object. After rejecting some common Quinean sceptical arguments against the very idea of de re necessity, I outline and briefly defend three central tenets of real essentialism derived from the relation between: essence and identity; essence and existence; essence and property. I end by locating real essentialism within a broader programme called philosophical traditionalism.

'The Kalam Cosmological Argument Neither Bloodied nor Bowed: A Response to Graham Oppy', Philosophia Christi 3 (2001): 193-196.

This paper responds to Graham Oppy's challenge to the Kalam Cosmological Argument entitled 'Time, Successive Addition and Kalam Cosmological Arguments', in Philosophia Christi 3 (2001), pp.181-91. I look specifically at attacks on the argument based on the confusion of actual and potential infinity, scepticism about processes, doubt about whether the beginning of the universe can be adequately formulated, and the impossibility of traversing the infinite.

'Is there a Right to be Wrong?', Philosophy 75 (2000): 517-537.

Freedom of belief is one of the entrenched values in modern society. Interpreted as the right not to be coerced into believing something, it is surely correct. But most people take it to mean that there is a right to false belief, a right to be wrong . People think that freedom of thought is a good thing, and this must include the freedom to make mistakes. It is also often thought that making mistakes is a life-enhancing and essential part of personal development. I argue that these ideas are false. Beginning with an examination of the basic good of truth, and making comparisons with other goods like health and friendship, I argue that there is a duty to believe only the truth, which thus logically excludes the right also to believe falsehood. I distinguish between the strict wrongness of false belief and the fact that, because of our epistemic limitations , we are not always to be blamed for our false beliefs. Even in the case of those beliefs which are involuntary, there is no right to have them if they are false, even though we are not to be blamed for having them. The right to be wrong, I conclude, is a modern myth.

'On the Cardinality of the Cardinal Virtues', International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7 (1999): 305-322.

This paper is a detailed study of what are traditionally called the cardinal virtues: prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude. I defend what I call the Cardinality Thesis, that the traditional four and no others are cardinal. I define cardinality in terms of three sub-theses, the first being that the cardinal virtues are jointly necessary for the possession of every other virtue, the second that each of the other virtues is a species of one of the four cardinals, and the third that many of the other virtues are also auxiliaries of one or more cardinals. I provide abstract arguments for each sub-thesis, followed by illustration from concrete cases. I then use these results to shed light on the two fundamental problems of the acquisition of the virtues and their unity, proving some further theses in the latter case.

'Adolf Grünbaum and the Beginning of the Universe', Philosophia Naturalis 36 (1999): 187-194.

One of the objections raised to the Kalam Cosmological Argument (KCA) (the universe began to exist; whatever begins to exist has a cause of the beginning of its existence; therefore the universe has a cause of the beginning of its existence [which, by further argument, is claimed to be God]) is that the universe did not begin to exist. Against William Lane Craig, KCA's stoutest current defender, Adolf Grünbaum proposes two models of the universe, both of which have adherents, and neither of which implies that the universe began to exist. Craig has already replied to Grünbaum, but his remarks on the first cosmological model are more effective than those on the second. In this paper I outline the two models and show contra Grünbaum that they both imply the universe did begin to exist. I argue that clarification of the concept of a beginning , which Grünbaum misunderstands, helps us to see why his second cosmological model does not undermine the first premise of KCA.

'On an Alleged Fallacy in Aristotle', Philosophical Papers 27 (1998): 107-118.

This paper seeks to refute the notorious charge made (by Geach, Urmson et al.) against Aristotle that he is guilty of a quantifier shift fallacy at the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, when he argues: ‘Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim.’ I show that Aristotle does indeed argue in the way Geach asserts, but that, contrary to his accusers, the reasoning is not fallacious. Second-order logic is used to show why this is so, and further observations on the nature of the good are made in light of the acquittal of Aristotle.

'Modal Properties, Moral Status, and Identity', Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 (1997): 259-298.

This paper is a critique of the metaphysical claims underlying Peter Singer and Helga Kuhse's arguments for the permissibility of human embryo experimentation. I refute their objections to the claim that the zygote and embryo are individual human beings, which objections are based on phenomena associated with fission, totipotency, cloning, and parthenogenesis. Once we understand the metaphysics behind such phenomena, we can see that conception is an ontologically special event, contrary to Singer and Kuhse. The moral status of the zygote and embryo is not undermined by the specious metaphysical arguments considered here.

'Voluntary Euthanasia and Justice', in D.S. Oderberg and J.A. Laing (eds), Human Lives: Critical Essays on Consequentialist Bioethics (London/New York: Macmillan/St Martin's Press, 1997): 225-240.

This paper sets out to answer the question: Does a person who kills another at the latter's request commit an injustice against that person? Defining justice in terms of rights, it is argued that the right to life is inalienable; hence, that voluntary euthanasia is always an injustice by the killer against the killed. Inalienability is justified in three ways. First, it is shown that there is nothing peculiar in the concept of an inalienable right and that even consequentialism must recognize at least one such right. Secondly, some plausible examples of inalienable rights are considered and a purported refutation of inalienability based on the analogy with property rights is dismissed. Thirdly, a positive account is outlined, according to which the right to life is seen as fundamental to a theory of human good.

'Coincidence Under a Sortal', Philosophical Review 105 (1996): 145-171.

This paper defends the thesis (called the Substance Thesis) that no two substances belonging to the same substantial kind can be in the same place at the same time. First, weaker theses allowing certain types of coincidence are distinguished and demonstrated. Secondly, the Substance Thesis is elaborated and a failed attempt to refute it is discussed. Thirdly, the thesis is shown not to be refuted by cases (called Leibnizian) of coinciding, ontologically dependent objects. Fourthly, it is shown in terms of discussion of key examples why coincidence is impossible for substances. Finally, the Substance Thesis is applied to personal identity, to show why persons cannot coincide and to refute a recent attempt to prove that they can.

'A Paradox about Authority', Analysis 51 (1991): 153-160.

This paper discusses the case of a sovereign elected by the people of a mythical state in order to safeguard and faithfully to transmit to his successors the people's sacred religious beliefs. After his election he enacts a law invalidating the election of heretics; but it turns out that he too fails under it. Is he validly elected? The question is left unanswered, but the source of the problem is discussed, various proposals are rejected, and both similarities to and differences from the Liar Paradox are noted.

'Some Problems of Identity over Time', Cogito 5 (1991): 14-20.

This survey introduces some of the central puzzles in the metaphysics of identity over time, written for a general philosophical audience. Beginning with the problem of temporary intrinsics - how a single object can possess contradictory properties at different times without logical absurdity - the paper examines the dominant response of temporal part theory and its ontology of object-stages. It then considers the prospects for a criterion of identity over time, assessing spatiotemporal continuity and its vulnerability to counterexamples involving fission and reassembly. Further puzzles examined include the Ship of Theseus, the brain transplant case and the intrinsicness of identity, the sorites paradox as applied to persistence, and the distinction between identity and constitution. The paper concludes by questioning whether the reductionist, Humean orthodoxy underlying temporal part theory is ultimately either derivable from physics or philosophically satisfying.

'Reply to Sprigge on Personal and Impersonal Identity', Mind 98 (1989): 129-134.

In ‘Personal and Impersonal Identity’ ( Mind 97 (1988): 29-49), Timothy Sprigge discusses reasons for a general suspicion of trans-temporal identity, and rejects what he says are the usual grounds given against the suspicion, providing instead his own reasons for rejecting it. He concludes that trans-temporal identity, including personal identity, is as genuine a case of identity as what he considers to be the paradigmatic case of identity. In this reply I take issue with some of the basic elements of Sprigge’s argument.

'Johnston on Human Beings', The Journal of Philosophy 86 (1989): 137-141.

This is a reply to the paper by Mark Johnston in The Journal of Philosophy 54 (1987): 59-83, entitled ‘Human Beings’. Johnston proposes a solution to various problems of personal identity based on the notion of the person as a ‘human being’, a kind essentially distinct from the kind ‘human organism’, which is a biological kind. It is argued that Johnston's idiosyncratic use of ‘human being’ is both ad hoc and obscure, and does not illuminate the debate over personal identity. Moreover, it can be seen that Johnston's position collapses into the sort of Parfitian reductionism with which he wishes to contrast it, and which he so rightly opposes.

'Kripke and "Quus"', Theoria 53 (1987): 115-120.

Philosophers have conceded too much to Kripke in their voluminous discussion of the ‘sceptical paradox’ he derives from Wittgenstein. There is a distinction between what a person ‘means’ at a given time and what he ‘will do’ at a later time. The speaker ‘must’ mean plus by ‘plus’, because he knowingly performs addition for x and y less than 57; he only ‘trivially’ means quus because his behaviour is trivially in accord with the possibility of his deviating in infinitely many ways. But the hypothesis that he non-trivially, or seriously means quus rather than plus is undermined by the very definition of that hypothesis.

'Perceptual Relativism', Philosophia 16 (1986): 1-9.

The argument from differing perceptual apparatus (ADP) holds that because different species perceive the world through different sense organs, there is no privileged or species-neutral access to reality, and hence that perceptual relativism follows. This paper argues that ADP is self-defeating. Any attempt to construct the argument requires the relativist to invoke non-human perceivers - flies, horses, aliens - as bearers of alternative perceptual systems; but in doing so, the relativist necessarily employs human sense-directed language and presupposes the mind-independent existence of those perceivers as objects of human experience. The very scaffolding of the argument thus commits the relativist to the kind of perception-independent reality he seeks to undermine. Differences in perceptual apparatus between species are real but explicable empirically; they cannot establish relativism. The world, it is concluded, is irreducibly the human world, encompassing all that is and will be describable in human sense-directed language.